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MORAL DISCOURSE AND DESCRIPTIVE PROPERTIES 
BY BRAD MAJORS 
I discuss a strategy for grounding ethical naturalism propounded byFrank Jackson and more 
recently b Allan Gibbard: that he undisputed supervenience of the moral upon the natural (or 
descriptive) entails that moral properties are natural (or descriptive) properties. I show that his 
strategy falls foul of certain i dubitable constraints governing natural kinds; and I then rebut some 
objections. The upshot is that no viable strategy for supporting ethical naturalism is to be found 
along these lines. This result has additional consequences, bothfor Jackson's attempt to accommod- 
ate ethical discourse into the natural world, andfor Gibbard's purported 'meta-ethical synthesis'. 
Recent years have witnessed something of a renaissance of naturalistic 
approaches towards meta-ethical issues. Changes in the philosophy of mind 
and philosophy of science, notably the advent of non-reductive physical- 
ism and the related acceptance of the notion of necessary a posteriori synthetic 
property identities, have opened up new possibilities for such treatments. 
Partially as a result of this, it seemed for a time as if classical analytical 
naturalism was gone for ever. The sort of naturalism against which Moore 
fought seemed a little quaint, if not downright antiquated, in the face of 
some of these recent developments. 
This is no longer the case. A number of prominent contemporary 
theorists, notably Michael Smith' and Frank Jackson, have revived at least 
the spirit of the old naturalism, by arguing that there is a clear sense in 
which moral terms have purely descriptive semantic analyses. This claim is 
buttressed, in some cases, by an independent argument for the identity of 
moral and descriptive (or natural) properties. 
In this paper I shall examine the latter sort of argument, leaving the 
claimed semantic analysis for another occasion. There are three main ways 
for naturalists to argue that moral properties are natural (or descriptive) pro- 
perties. First, they can claim synonymy between moral and descriptive 
terms. If the claim holds good, and if, as is (nearly) universally granted, 
1 Smith is not a naturalist as such, but he accepts, with one important exception, Jackson's 
Lewisian approach towards analysing moral concepts. The exception concerns what he calls 
the 'permutation problem': see The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), PP- 54-6. 
C The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2005. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford ox4 2DQ, UK, 
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intension determines extension, then moral properties must be descriptive 
properties. Secondly, naturalists can opt for a purely theoretical identifica- 
tion, with no direct semantic commitments. Just as water was found to be 
identical with H20, for example, it might be claimed that the best ex- 
planation of various phenomena we confront is the identification of moral 
rightness with (say) maximization of expected utility. Thirdly, naturalists 
might argue that a proper understanding of what the term 'natural' means, 
in this context, is one on which moral properties are natural from the first, 
as it were, and consequently need not be identified with any other sort of 
property in order to attain the relevant sort of respectability.2 
Each of these strategies has its adherents, but there is no consensus on 
whether any of them is ultimately successful. There may initially appear to 
be a fourth possibility, however: some among the new analytical naturalists 
have argued that the undisputed supervenience of the moral upon the 
natural itself entails that moral properties are natural properties. This is a 
significant result, if correct; for each of the three strategies mentioned above 
employs certain contentious premises rejected by opponents of naturalism. 
But to my knowledge no one, naturalist or not, denies that the moral super- 
venes upon the descriptive. Hence the argument merits close scrutiny. 
The plan for this paper is as follows. ?1I is devoted to setting out the core 
of the central argument, as given byJackson. In ?II I briefly outline the way 
in which a similar argument is given, more recently, by Allan Gibbard. 
Gibbard's framework isvery different from Jackson's, but I work to isolate a 
core of agreed assumptions, which each uses to derive the conclusion that 
moral properties are descriptive or natural properties.3 ?III is concerned to 
provide criticism of these assumptions, and, consequently, of the arguments 
given by Jackson and Gibbard more generally. ?IV considers and attempts 
to rebut certain objections, and ?V contains a few concluding remarks. 
I 
Jackson wants to solve what he calls the 'location problem' for ethics. A 
location problem concerns how to accommodate the ontology presupposed 
2 There is also now a quasi-naturalistic version of moral realism, defended in P. Bloom- 
field's Moral Reality (Oxford UP, 2001). In 'Quasi-Naturalism and Moral Reality', Ratio 
(forthcoming), I argue that Bloomfield's project fails. 3 There are important differences between descriptive and natural properties: descriptive 
properties are typically thought to include supernatural properties (if any). Jackson is con- 
cerned to show that moral properties are descriptive, Gibbard that normative concepts pick 
out natural properties. For my purposes, however, there is no significant difference between 
the claim that moral properties are natural and the claim that they are descriptive, and I shall 
consequently employ the relevant locutions interchangeably. 
? The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2005
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by a certain range of discourse into the natural world. His preferred strategy 
for solving the various location problems he considers is to invoke the 'entry 
by entailment thesis': if it can be shown that the world's psychological 
nature, for example, is entailed by the world's physical nature, then we can 
reconcile the existence of the psychological with the claim that a complete 
story about the world can be told in purely physical terms.4 The same basic 
strategy is employed with respect to moral discourse. In the case of the 
ethical (p. I19), the key to the entailment is a certain supervenience thesis 
linking moral and descriptive properties, namely, 
S. For all worlds w and w*, if w and w* are exactly alike descriptively, 
then they are exactly alike ethically. 
This is what Jackson calls an 'interworld', as opposed to an 'intraworld' 
supervenience thesis; more commonly the distinction drawn is between 
global supervenience theses like (S), and local claims such as Kim's strong 
supervenience - these latter relate not worlds but individuals within worlds. 
Moral supervenience is special, according to Jackson, in that (S) holds 
true in its unrestricted form, while global psychophysical supervenience 
claims like the following do not: 
4/Ag. For all worlds w and w*, if w and w* are exactly alike physically, then 
w and w* are exactly alike psychologically. 
This claim is false, according to most physicalists, since two worlds might (it 
seems) be indistinguishable physically, but differ in that one but not the 
other has added onto it some minded ghostly or spiritual entity. Physicalists 
deny, of course, that there are any such entities in the actual world; but they 
are apt to acknowledge the metaphysical possibility, which is all that is 
required for the present point. The antecedent of (4A/) holds for such a 
case, but its consequent fails, since the world with the add-on has mental 
states not present in the other world. There are various proposals for re- 
stricting the thesis to accommodate this apparent possibility, which need not 
concern us here (seeJackson, pp. 11-12, and references therein). The import- 
ant point is that Jackson thinks (S) holds without restriction, and that it is 
this special feature of moral supervenience which he claims is responsible for 
the identity between moral and descriptive properties (p. i39). (I shall later 
question whether moral supervenience in fact has this special status.) 
The argument proceeds thus. Let E be a sentence which is about the 
ethical nature of a world, in the sense that it contains ethical terms (as well 
as descriptive terms), and asserts about the world some genuine ethical 
content. Each world at which E is true will have some descriptive nature; 
4 Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford UP, 1998), p. 8. 
? The Editors of The Philosophical QUarterly, 2005 
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and an extremely complex descriptive sentence could, in principle, give that 
descriptive nature in full. Now suppose that E is true at worlds wl, w2, ..., w, 
and let DI, D2, ..., D, be the purely descriptive sentences true at each which 
give their respective descriptive natures in full. 'Then the disjunction of D1, 
D2, etc., will also be a purely descriptive sentence, call it D. But then E 
entails and is entailed by D.... It follows that ethical properties are descrip- 
tive properties' (Jackson, p. 123). E entails D because any world in which E 
is true is one whose descriptive nature is captured by one of D's disjuncts - if 
E is true then at least one disjunct of D is true, which makes D itself true; 
D entails E because D is precisely the disjunction of (names of) all possible 
descriptive realizers of the state of affairs described by E - if D is true then 
so is at least one of its disjuncts, and this disjunct describes descriptive 
sufficient conditions for the obtaining of the ethical state of affairs de- 
signated by E. Jackson notes that the argument applied here to sentences 
can also be given for predicates. 
I mentioned above that moral supervenience claims are thought to be 
special in that they need not be restricted, as psychophysical claims must be. 
We can now see, according to Jackson, an important consequence of this. It 
is that ethical language can make no distinctions which cannot be made in 
descriptive terms. This is a stronger result than that yielded by the relevant 
restrictions of (O/W): even if physicalism is true, certain Cartesian views of 
the mind will make distinctions which cannot be marked in physical voc- 
abulary. Physical vocabulary will be powerless to describe the difference 
between two worlds which are physically but not mentally indistinguishable. 
'By contrast, ethical ways of partitioning the possibilities make no distinc- 
tions that are not mirrored in descriptive ways of partitioning them' (p. 123)- 
It will be useful to set out the argument in the following schematic form, 
which I think accurately represents the line of thought behind Jackson's 
contentions here (for simplicity I focus on predicates rather than closed 
sentences). I shall call it Jackson's argument'. 
I. For every ethical predicate P, there is a necessarily co-extensive, purely 
descriptive predicate D 
2. No distinctions can be made with P that cannot be made with D 
3. D refers to a property 
4. The property it refers to is descriptive (or natural) 
5. P refers to the same property, and is thus itself descriptive (or natural) 
C. Therefore thical properties are descriptive (or natural) properties. 
Let it be granted that the argument, or a natural extension of it, is valid. It 
will be argued below that certain of the premises are not true. Before getting 
to that, however, I turn to Gibbard's recent argument for the claim that 
? The Editors of The Philosophical Q~uarter1y, 2005 
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normative properties, including prominently ethical ones, are identical with 
natural properties.5 The goal of the next section is to see how Gibbard's case 
maps onto the argument just sketched, which will then be evaluated. 
II 
In the previous section, I have extracted from Jackson's discussion an 
argument sketch which captures the essence of his case for the thesis that 
moral properties are descriptive properties. Allan Gibbard has outlined in a 
recent book an approach to the logic of normative concepts which differs in 
many important respects from that taken by Jackson.6 However, Gibbard 
too contends that normative concepts, including moral concepts, pick out 
descriptive or natural properties; and his argument supporting this conten- 
tion is similar enough to Jackson's to warrant treating them together. The 
purpose of this section is to introduce enough of the terminology and 
apparatus of Gibbard's book to show how his case maps onto the argument 
sketch provided above. I shall then proceed in ?III to criticize the form of 
argument common to bothJackson and Gibbard. 
Certain concepts, according to Gibbard, are 'plan-laden', rather than 
being purely descriptive. They concern, that is, how to act and decide, 
rather than (merely) how things happen to be (p. 7). Most of his book is 
taken up with investigating the logic of such concepts, and a central thesis 
is that normative concepts are themselves plan-laden. This is taken by 
Gibbard to provide an (otherwise unavailable) explanation for the somewhat 
peculiar behaviour of normative concepts. Though there are some shifts of 
emphasis from his previous work, the book is, of course, squarely within the 
expressivist tradition. 
One central ambition of the project, however, is to effect what Gibbard 
calls 'a meta-ethical synthesis': to show that the seemingly disparate doc- 
trines of expressivism, intuitionism (or non-naturalism) and naturalism are 
seen to have much more in common than is often thought, when once we 
gain a proper understanding of moral discourse. 'This book presents a kind 
of synthesis of these positions; contrasts between these three families, I 
argue, are far less acute than is normally supposed' (Gibbard, p. Ig9). 
A key part of this so-called synthesis is Gibbard's claim that plan-laden 
(normative) concepts pick out natural properties. This claim is central to the 
5 Gibbard would be more comfortable with the claim that ethical concepts pick out natural 
properties; but still I think the way things are put in the text is not wholly misleading, given 
Gibbard's deflationary view of properties. 6 A. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live (Harvard UP, 2003). 
C The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2005
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following among Gibbard's primary contentions here: (i) that while non- 
naturalists such as Moore were correct about moral concepts, naturalists are 
right that there are no non-natural properties (p. 98); (ii) that normative 
concepts, understood as plan-laden, can still provide legitimate causal ex- 
planations (p. 21o); (iii) that while a certain sort of knowledge is available 
concerning plan-laden concepts such as the thing to do, knowing that so and so 
is the thing to do consists in something factual or naturalistic (p. 227); and 
finally (iv) that the notion of a response-dependent property is something of 
a confusion, in as much as there are only response-dependent concepts 
of prosaically natural properties (p. 250). These theses, while not exhausting 
Gibbard's attempted synthesis, form a central core of it; and it is fair to say, 
I think, that without the claim which supports them, that plan-laden con- 
cepts pick out natural properties, the so-called synthesis would fall to pieces. 
What, then, is Gibbard's argument for this claim? One who is 'hyper- 
decided', in his terminology, has a plan for dealing with every possible 
contingency. Gibbard thinks that if he can show that a hyperdecided 
planner is committed to the thesis that moral concepts are ways of con- 
ceiving natural properties, then the thesis will be adequately established; 
in part this is because we are all planners, and the hyperdecided planner is 
only an idealization of normal planners such as we are (pp. 90-I). I shall not 
be concerned with this part of Gibbard's argument. Let him be granted that 
what holds for a hyperdecided planner holds as well for us; and while I am 
at it, I shall grant him the dubitable claim that if we are all committed to a 
thesis, then that thesis is true (at least in this sort of context). It will be shown 
in the next section that his argument still fails to establish the key thesis. The 
following is one way of setting out the core of 'Gibbard's argument': 
i. One who is hyperdecided will take an act with property P1 to be the 
thing to do in situation S1, an act with property P2 to be the thing to do 
in situation S2, and so on 
2. We can then construct the complex property P1 v P2 v P3 v ... v P,, 
which I shall call 'P*' 
3. The plan is, in effect, to do in every situation something with property 
P* - this is to accept that there is a property of being the thing to do, 
namely, P* 
C. Therefore P* is a prosaically factual property, being constructed out of 
recognitionally grounded properties P1, P2, etc. 
Certain of the terms used here must be explained. To take something to be 
the thing to do, for Gibbard, is in effect o make an all-things-considered 
judgement in favour of doing it. It is to rule out all other options. (Viewing 
something as being OK to do, to take Gibbard's second most prominent 
? The Editors of The Philosophical Qjarterny, 2005 
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plan-laden notion, entails seeing it as acceptable: it is to rule out ruling it 
out.) And a recognitionally grounded property he takes to be a property the 
instantiation of which we are capable, in normal circumstances, of recogniz- 
ing. For present purposes, there is no significant difference between the 
notion of recognitionally grounded properties and that of natural or descrip- 
tive properties. 
Like Jackson, Gibbard takes it that the normative supervenes on the 
natural; corresponding to every application of a plan-laden concept, then, 
there will be (an instantiation of) a natural property (or set of them). This 
will be the property the hyperdecided observer fastens onto in each situa- 
tion. We then simply disjoin (names of) all possible situations, and take the 
natural property corresponding to each disjunct, in order to form 
the disjunctive property P*. Since each disjunct in P* is itself natural in the 
relevant sense, it follows, according to Gibbard, that P* is a factual or 
natural property, to the existence of which any hyperdecided planner is 
committed. This conclusion, taken together with the initial assumptions 
granted to him above, entails his thesis that normative concepts pick out 
natural properties. 
Gibbard's argument is equivalent to Jackson's in the following sense: 
there are two essential claims made, (a) that there is a complex disjunctive 
property corresponding to every coherent normative concept; and (b) that 
this property is a natural property. The rest of the argument is irrelevant for 
my purposes. The first premise is in effect rue by virtue of the definition of 
'hyperdecided', along with moral supervenience. The third step explicates 
what is claimed in the first wo steps of the argument. Premise (2) corre- 
sponds with claim (a), and the conclusion with claim (b). These two key 
claims match up with steps (3) and (4) ofJackson's argument. For the rest of 
the paper I shall confine attention to Jackson's version of the argument, 
which employs more familiar terminology. Where it is not obvious in what 
follows how a particular point made applies to Gibbard, I shall indicate 
what I take to be the connection. 
III 
It has been granted that the argument in question (Jackson's argument) is 
valid. Premise (I), the claim that there is a necessarily co-extensive descrip- 
tive predicate corresponding to every ethical predicate, is contentious only 
in the sense that the complex disjunctive predicate in question may be 
infinitely long. Some may object to the idea of an infinitely long piece of 
language, though I shall not do so. The second premise of the argument, 
? The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2005 
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which claims that no distinctions can be made with the ethical predicate in 
question that cannot be made with the corresponding descriptive predicate, 
raises issues best discussed later on. I shall suggest below that Jackson is 
involved in an equivocation concerning the notion of a distinction. 
The third step is the assumption that the disjunctive descriptive predicate 
in question refers to a property. There are conceptions of properties accord- 
ing to which this is trivially true. Model theorists sometimes assume that the 
set of properties is closed under Boolean operations, which is to say that 
the result of applying an operation such as disjunction to a pair of properties 
is itself a member of the set of properties.7 And then there is Stephen 
Schiffer's notion of 'pleonastic properties', according to which the existence 
of a property is guaranteed by the legitimacy of certain logical transforma- 
tions. So to say that being a cat is a property is to say nothing more than 
that a certain type of sentence with only one singular term, such as 'Baruch 
is a cat', can be transformed into an equivalent sentence with two singular 
terms - 'Baruch has the property of being a cat'.8 
These conceptions of properties are highly controversial, and in my view 
wrongheaded. But the issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Here I shall 
simply note two things: first, that premise (3) ofJackson's argument (and step 
(2) of Gibbard's) presupposes some such abundant conception of properties 
(in the absence of such a conception, it is far from obvious that P refers to 
anything at all); secondly, even granting the truth of (3), Jackson's (and Gib- 
bard's) conclusion does not follow. Even if we grant that there is such a 
complex property as can be formed by disjoining (names of) the various 
subvenient bases of any given ethical property, it is not plausible, as I shall 
show, to think that this is a descriptive or natural property. 
I take as an example the ethical predicate 'is morally good'. According to 
the first premise of Jackson's argument this predicate is necessarily co- 
extensive with a certain disjunctive descriptive predicate, namely, 
D. Pix v P2x v P3x v ... v P,x. 
Each disjunct of D refers to the descriptive correlate - the subvenient base - 
of the referent of the ethical predicate as used on a given occasion; each 
designates the natural state of affairs which realizes particular instances of 
moral goodness. I have granted, though only for the sake of argument, that 
D refers to a property. What must now be investigated is whether this 
property is, asJackson and Gibbard claim, a natural property. 
7 Gibbard (pp. 99-0oo) explicitly endorses this view of properties. While he also occasionally 
claims that moral supervenience holds a priori (e.g., at p. 92), this plays no role in the argument 
considered, which, likeJackson's, requires merely that supervenience holds of necessity. 8 See Schiffer's Remnants of Meaning (MIT Press, 1987), p. 51; and The Things We Mean 
(Oxford UP, 2003), pp. 6Iff. 
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One way to argue that it is would be to point out that each disjunct in D 
refers to a natural property - there is a sense in which this is true - and then 
to claim on this basis that D itself picks out a natural property. (This is 
essentially what Gibbard does, in the final step of his argument.) But this 
looks very much like the fallacy of composition. From the fact that members 
of a certain whole possess a given property, it manifestly does not follow that 
the whole itself possesses the property in question. Jackson could insist, how- 
ever, that while the argument form, strictly speaking, may be fallacious, 
there is nothing in the particular case at hand which indicates that it is 
problematic to view D as picking out a natural property. Some reason needs 
to be provided, the thought might be, to defeat the presumption in favour of 
viewing D as corresponding to a natural property, given that each of its 
disjuncts designates omething unproblematically natural. 
Here is such a reason: step (4) in Jackson's argument (which corresponds 
to the fourth step of Gibbard's argument) violates an independently plaus- 
ible constraint on properties or kinds: 
Kind Constraint - Predicate Formulation: if a property is of a kind K, then it must 
be possible to pick out that property using only the descriptive and 
explanatory resources of level K. 
Being morally good is not a natural property, because it is not possible to 
pick out (refer to) the property using only the descriptive resources of the 
natural level. The natural level, for my purposes, may be viewed as exclud- 
ing only the ethical or evaluative. So my claim is that one cannot even refer 
to the property of being morally good without using one's ethical or evalua- 
tive knowledge. If this is so, then according to the constraint, the property in 
question is not a natural property. 
The key point is that the disjunctive predicate D cannot even be formed 
without employing our knowledge of which natural properties realize (or 
subvene under) the property of being morally good. That is, without using 
the descriptive and explanatory resources of ethical discourse (which is not 
part of naturalistic discourse, I am supposing with Jackson and Gibbard), 
one cannot so much as construct he predicate which is supposed to refer to 
a natural property. So because one cannot refer to the property of being 
morally good using only the descriptive and explanatory resources of the 
natural, being morally good is not a natural property. 
Why accept this constraint? There are two broad sorts of reason. First, 
there are no clear, uncontroversial cases of kinds which fail to meet it. Elec- 
trons are physical kinds, and they are picked out by 'electron', by 'negatively 
charged particle', etc., all terms of physical science. Propositional attitudes 
are kinds of common sense psychology, and they are picked out by the 
? The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 200oo5 
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proprietary terms of that discipline, 'belief', 'desire', 'pro-attitude', etc. 
Secondly, it is unclear what it means to claim that a property is of a kind K, if 
this constraint does not hold. To reject it is to be committed to maintaining 
that x is (say) a physical kind, though it is not possible even to refer to x using 
only the descriptive and explanatory resources of physical science (that is, 
despite the fact that one cannot even talk about x in the language of physics). 
This is surely incoherent. 
Suppose it is granted that as things stand, one cannot refer to the 
property of being morally good using only purely natural descriptive and 
explanatory resources; one might still think that the problem can be over- 
come by simply adding D to this stock of resources.9 Since D does determine 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of the property in 
question, adding it to the descriptive resources of 'the natural' indeed 
appears to overcome the difficulty lately emphasized. 
The problem is that this manceuvre renders completely trivial the claim 
that moral goodness is a natural property. For what is being proposed, in 
effect, is that we simply add a moral concept to naturalistic discourse, 
supplementing the natural with (a portion of) the moral. Little wonder, then, 
that we can now refer to this moral property using only naturalistic terms! 
Given the plausible assumption that the kind constraint provides sufficient 
as well as necessary conditions for being a property or kind of level K, this ad 
hoc fix would make any property whatsoever natural. Simply add to the nat- 
uralistic lexicon a term which uniquely and determinately picks out the 
property in question, and one can refer to that property using only natural 
descriptive resources. If this allows the initial proposal to meet the kind 
constraint, it also makes being a natural property a completely trivial and 
uninteresting affair. If being morally good were really a natural property, 
then there would be naturalistic explanatory and descriptive resources 
within existing theory which provide means by which the property can be 
designated; but there are no such means; hence it is not a natural property. 
Another way in which the futility of the suggested move displays itself is 
that no opponent of naturalism has ever meant to deny that moral proper- 
ties are natural in the sense that if one adds to naturalistic discourse a term 
referring to a given moral property, one can thereby refer to this property in 
purely naturalistic terms. The suggestion makes nonsense of the disagree- 
ment between naturalists and non-naturalists, a reliable sign that something 
has gone wrong. 
Not all additions to theoretical discourse are ad hoc in this way. Often a 
term is introduced in response to theoretical pressure, as was the case with 
9 N. Block makes this suggestion in connection with disjunctive mental predicates; see 
'Antireductionism Slaps Back', Philosophical Perspectives, 11 (1997), pp. 107-32, at p. 113. 
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'electron'. Physicists once lacked the means to refer to electrons, but empir- 
ical discovery, along with theoretical refinement, remedied the situation. It is 
not plausible, however, that any empirical discovery, or theoretical pressure, 
is going to provide a reason for introducing D into naturalistic discourse. 
Certainly it is no part of the meta-ethical views of Jackson or Gibbard that 
natural science will one day require the use of moral concepts. 
The above formulation of the kind constraint can cause unease from 
another direction, in as much as it appears to make it possible to derive 
ontological conclusions from premises about what can and cannot be done 
with certain sorts of language. Surely, one might reason, the ontological 
situation is independent of the terms we happen to have hit upon in the 
course of enquiry. On this sort of view, the admitted fact that natural 
discourse contains no means by which to refer to the property of being 
morally good has no tendency to show that the latter is not a natural 
property; the latter claim concerns how things stand in the mind- and 
language-independent world, and the former is precisely about language. 
The correct reply here is to insist hat when things go well, we employ the 
kind-terms we do because of what is in the world; these terms, like the theor- 
ies which are partially couched in terms of them, are, we hope, accurate 
reflections of an extra-linguistic reality.'0 One may doubt whether this is so, 
but in so doubting one is questioning, it seems, scientific realism, rather than 
the above criterion as such. Nevertheless, it is important that the following is 
in the relevant sense equivalent to the above formulation of the constraint: 
Kind Constraint - Property Formulation: if a property is of a kind K, then the 
members of its extension must have something in common which is 
visible from level K. 
I shall first explicate and try to defend this version of the constraint, and 
then remark on the equivalence of the two formulations. 
Natural kinds are classically conceived as property types which play a 
certain crucial role in scientific explanation. Members of a given kind are 
able to play that role only because they share certain central features. Every 
member of the set of electrons has something in common with the others: a 
certain mass, a certain type of charge. Having mass and having charge are 
physical attributes. A particle's mass, and its charge, can be described within 
the proprietary vocabulary of physics. This is part of what makes it plausible 
10 See D. Pereboom and H. Kornblith, 'The Metaphysics of Irreducibility', Philosophical 
Studies, 63 (i991), pp. 125-45, for an argument that what kind terms we employ is no accidental 
matter, and more generally on the poverty of disjunctive strategies in discussions of property- 
identity and reduction. The kind constraints appealed to here are also arguably implicit in 
J. Fodor's 'Special Sciences', repr. in his Representations (MIT Press, 1981), pp. 127-45. The 
argument of each of these papers seems to me to support the constraints. 
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to say that electrons form a physical kind. Every belief has something 
psychologically in common with every other belief: each has its content 
essentially, and each figures in like counterfactual-supporting generalizations 
which may as well be called laws. All of this is a matter of psychology, which 
is an essential part of what makes it plausible to say that beliefs are psycho- 
logical kinds. 
Two things must be true of instances of a given property type for that 
property type to count as a natural kind of level K. First, each instance must 
have something in common with the others; secondly, this commonality 
must be visible from level K. Electrons and beliefs satisfy both of these 
demands. The disjunctive 'property' referred to by D satisfies the first but 
not the second. Each disjunct of D refers to a realizer of moral goodness. 
These realizers all have something in common, namely, being sufficient for 
the instantiation of the property of moral goodness. But this is not a 
naturalistic matter. As I have been emphasizing, in order even to form the 
disjunction in the first place one must have knowledge of the extension of a 
non-natural moral concept. The referents of the disjuncts of D do not have 
anything naturalistic in common; what they do share is not visible from the 
naturalistic descriptive level, and hence moral goodness is not a natural 
property. 
An analogy may be helpful here. Mental properties upervene on physical 
properties, at least in the sense that fixing the world's distribution of phys- 
ical properties (or instances of them) suffices to fix its distribution of mental 
properties." Given this, one can formulate, in principle, physicalistic 
sufficient conditions for the instantiation of any mental property. Let 'T' be 
a mental predicate designating mental property T, and let '4)' be the 
disjunctive predicate which refers to the disjunction of all possible physical 
realizers of T. Then '"' and '(D' are necessarily co-extensive. But the 
members of the extension of '(D' have nothing physical in common with one 
another. As typed by physics, that is, they share nothing in common. Hence 
they do not form a physical kind. As typed by psychology, on the other 
hand, they do have something in common, and it is thus plausible to say 
that they are instances of a psychological kind. The situation here is 
precisely analogous to that between moral and descriptive properties.12 
The two formulations of the kind constraint are equivalent in this sense: 
given an ideal or completed set of natural sciences, there would be a kind 
" I here set aside the complication noted in ?I, concerning the possible need to restrict his 
sort of claim. This will not affect he argument. 
12 It can be objected that moral supervenience holds necessarily, while mental super- 
venience is contingent. This is Jackson's view. However, it will be argued in ?IV that Jackson 
fails to identify a real difference between moral and mental supervenience. 
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term corresponding to every natural kind.13 And one would be able to refer 
to a given property using the descriptive and explanatory resources of kind 
K if and only if instances of the property had in common something visible 
from level K. For an ideal theory, or set of theories, there is no relevant 
difference between the two formulations. Our actual theories are of course 
not ideal; but the arguments of this paper are not affected by the stipulation 
that we are concerned with ideal theory, since, as mentioned above, neither 
Jackson nor Gibbard wants to hold the view that as the natural sciences 
progress, they will come to incorporate moral terms and concepts. 
It has been the burden of this section to argue that there is no interesting 
sense in which the mere supervenience of the moral upon the natural 
implies that moral properties are natural properties. One final consideration 
serves to buttress this conclusion. If supervenience did in fact imply the 
identity of the supervening class of properties with the subvening class, 
then an extremely popular position in the philosophy of mind, non- 
reductive physicalism, would be an incoherent line to take. For every 
proponent of this view will acknowledge some version of psychophysical 
supervenience; but as non-reductionists, they deny the identity of mental 
with physical properties. IfJackson and Gibbard are right, then this sort of 
view is incoherent. But it is surely not incoherent, whether or not it is 
ultimately plausible. This is another reason, which is clearly quite similar to 
the above reflection concerning the disagreement between naturalists and 
their opponents, to reject the view that supervenience implies property 
identity. 14 
IV 
In this penultimate section I shall consider a number of objections to the 
argument thus far. First, some theorists, including Jackson, take it that 
logical equivalence between properties implies identity. Two properties 
are logically equivalent if they are instantiated in all and only the same 
possible circumstances, or alternatively, if the predicates referring to them 
are necessarily co-extensive. 'Is morally good' and D are necessarily 
co-extensive, and this might be thought to imply that they refer to the same 
property. 
13 This is oversimplified, in as much as it is plausible that not all natural kinds are denizens 
of the 'natural sciences', properly so-called. (So much was implicit in my treatment of 
propositional attitudes as natural kinds.) But nothing here turns on the point. 14 As I have said, Jackson emphasizes what he takes to be an important difference between 
moral and mental supervenience which is relevant here. I shall deal with this argument in the 
following section. 
? The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2oo5 
This content downloaded from 129.237.189.219 on Wed, 23 Apr 2014 16:01:24 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
488 BRAD MAJORS 
This is a large issue, and I shall restrict myself to criticizing briefly Jack- 
son's remarks on the matter. As is well known, being equiangular and being 
equilateral are logically equivalent properties; but it is not plausible that they 
are the same property. Jackson contends that the difference is in how we 
conceive the world, rather than a difference in the world itself. However, it 
comes perilously close to begging the question to insist, as he does, that the 
difference between sides and angles is not relevant to the question whether 
being an equilateral triangle and being an equiangular triangle are the same 
property. The plausible view of the situation is surely that we have here two 
different properties, rather than two different ways of conceiving the same 
property. One is the property (more precisely, the relation) of having sides all 
the same length as x, and the other is the property (relation) of having angles 
all the same size as x. Manifestly, sides and angles are not the same things. 
Jackson has done nothing, thus far, to defeat the presumption in favour of 
this natural view. (His view here also has the extremely implausible con- 
sequence that there is only one universally necessary property.) 
Jackson does go on to advance some positive considerations against hold- 
ing that ethical properties are distinct from descriptive ones, though the two 
are necessarily co-extensive. First, he claims that it is difficult to see how one 
could ever be justified in interpreting a language user's utterance of 'right', 
for example, as picking out a property distinct from that picked out by the 
necessarily co-extensive descriptive predicate associated with it. This is be- 
cause 'we know that the complete story about how and when the language 
user produces the word "right" can be given descriptively' (Jackson, p. 127). 
But it is difficult to see how this is supposed to amount to an argument, 
rather than a mere reiteration of Jackson's position on the matter. If the 
language user refers to a property which cannot be picked out in purely de- 
scriptive terms, then we have a very good reason for doubting whether the 
property in question is a descriptive one, irrespective of whether there may 
be artificially produced, logically co-extensive predicates. The fact that a 
complete story can be given in descriptive terms concerning how and when 
someone produces the term 'right' is wholly irrelevant o the issue. This is a 
fact about the (relative) explanatory completeness of psychology, or perhaps 
physiology; and no one is claiming that these disciplines need supplementing 
with ethical predicates or properties. The relevant question is whether the 
complete ethical story can be told in descriptive terms. It cannot be, if there is 
no way even to refer to ethical properties in purely descriptive language. As 
I shall show below, it is a fallacy to move directly from claims about super- 
venience to claims about 'complete stories' in this manner. 
Secondly, Jackson contends that the putative non-descriptive ethical 
properties in question could be of no ethical significance. They would be 
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what he calls 'ethical idlers': we would not take seriously someone who 
acknowledges that a contemplated action would kill many and save no one, 
but insists that whether the action is morally permissible is not settled by this 
alone and that we must also know whether the action has the extra non- 
descriptive property in question. This argument too is weak. It will be logic- 
ally entailed (given any plausible normative theory) that if the action has 
the descriptive features indicated, then given supervenience, it also has the 
ethical property of being morally impermissible. That there is no further 
question here has no tendency to show that ethical properties are identical 
with descriptive properties. It shows only something which is not in dispute, 
that the former supervene on the latter. 
Finally, Jackson distinguishes a more and a less extreme version of the 
sort of distinctness claim in question. The extreme view is that for every (poss- 
ibly complex) descriptive property there is a distinct, necessarily co-extensive 
non-descriptive property, perhaps an ethical property. He holds that this is 
absurd, and he is surely correct. The less extreme version of the view is that 
only some descriptive properties have associated with them necessarily co- 
extensive but distinct properties. The problem he sees (pp. 127-8) is how to 
find a principled basis for saying when this happens and when it does not. 
Why is there such a property in certain cases, but not in others? 
This too raises a large metaphysical issue, but the outlines of a plausible 
response can be presented here. On one non-reductionistic though still 
naturalistic view, some sets of descriptive properties correspond to (subvene 
under) explanatorily indispensable, autonomous ethical properties; some do 
not. This is no different from what we find with the various special sciences, 
themselves part of what Jackson thinks of as the descriptive realm. Certain 
sets of physical properties correspond to explanatorily indispensable, auto- 
nomous geological (chemical, biological, physiological, etc.) properties; some 
do not. Why is this? It is difficult to see the question as other than a demand 
for a reductive characterization of special science properties. But the de- 
mand may be legitimately rejected. Certain facts are brute; this is not denied 
by anyone in the present debate. The claim of the anti-reductionist about 
special science properties is just that the realm of the brute extends further 
than the reductionist supposes. It is just as much a basic fact about our uni- 
verse that it contains geological properties, with their respective subvenient 
physical bases, as that it contains fundamental physical properties, with their 
intrinsic natures. It is of course a disputed question whether moral proper- 
ties are profitably modelled on special science properties.5" But if they are, 
we are thereby provided with the resources to answerJackson's challenge. 
15 One central aspect of this issue is addressed in my 'Moral Explanation and the Special 
Sciences', Philosophical Studies, i13 (2003), pp. 121-52. 
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Indeed, the answer is available even if this view of moral properties is not 
plausible. For as I have shown, Jackson's challenge amounts to the question 
why moral properties have the subvenient bases they have. It would be an 
intolerable mystery, he implies, were it to turn out that there is no reductive 
explanation of this fact. But a precisely parallel situation exists with special 
science properties - the question whether moral properties are relevantly 
analogous to special science properties is not pertinent here. It is plausible 
that there is no reductive explanation available in the general special science 
case, but there is also no mystery created thereby. This is best seen, in my 
view, as a reductio of the charge of intolerable mystery which is required to 
fuelJackson's objection. 
Moving on to a distinct though related set of objections, it was noted 
above thatJackson holds that the 'special character' of the supervenience of 
the moral upon the natural ensures that moral properties are identical with 
natural properties. His point is that a supervenience thesis like (S) does not 
need the sort of qualification necessary in the case of (4/y), its psycho- 
physical counterpart; as a result, Jackson thinks that no distinctions can be 
made with moral discourse that cannot be made with natural discourse. 
This provides a reason for thinking that moral properties must be natural or 
descriptive properties. 
In what sense, though, is moral supervenience really different? Let us 
allow that there can be two worlds which are physically indiscernible but 
mentally distinct. So also there can be two worlds which are physically in- 
discernible but morally distinct. (Simply imagine a world just like ours, with a 
minded and malevolent ghost added onto it.) The mental and the moral are 
here on a par. What has happened is thatJackson has surreptitiously altered 
the subvenient base in moving from mental to moral supervenience. The 
base in the case of (S) is one of descriptive properties, and in the case of 
(4/N) is one of physical properties. It is thus a clear non sequitur to argue that 
because the former holds unrestrictedly, and the latter does not, there must 
be some important difference between moral and psychophysical super- 
venience. The difference lies with the relata, rather than with the relation. 
To confirm that this is the case, if (S) and (4/W) are now taken with 
descriptive, rather than physical, properties as subvenient bases, again there 
is no difference.'6 I have shown that, so construed, (S) has no need of restric- 
tion. But neither does the psychophysical thesis; for the minded ghost who, 
16 Some, most prominently Blackburn, have sought to show on different grounds that moral 
supervenience has a special character. These arguments are important, but they are 
orthogonal to present concerns, since Jackson does not press for any disanalogy between 
mental and moral supervenience over and above that already noted. Blackburn's argument 
requires separate treatment. 
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it was supposed, inhabits w but not w* will be counted as part of the descrip- 
tive inventory of the former. Hence in the envisaged situation the ante- 
cedent of (?/i,) is false. No difference, therefore, has been shown to obtain 
between the relations of moral and mental supervenience. 
But set that aside; suppose thatJackson is correct hat (S) does not require 
restriction, whereas its psychophysical counterpart does. What follows from 
this? Jackson thinks that premise (2) of his argument follows, the claim that 
no distinctions can be made with moral predicates which cannot be made 
with descriptive predicates. This is either false or trivial. It is false if what 
one means by (2) is that any given moral predicate is in principle dispens- 
able, since all the explanatory and codificational work in question can be 
done by the relevant counterpart of D. It was stressed in ?III above that 
predicates like D cannot even be constructed without employing our know- 
ledge of which descriptive properties realize properties like that of being 
morally good. So far from its being dispensable, we must use our knowledge 
concerning the moral even to form the disjunctive predicates in question. If 
moral properties were natural properties this would not be necessary. 
The claim is trivial if all one means by (2) is that one can form a 
necessarily co-extensive predicate for each moral predicate. This is not 
interesting: it follows directly from supervenience, and has no bearing on the 
issue whether moral and natural properties are identical, since both sides in 
the dispute acknowledge the truth of supervenience. 
It seems to me that Jackson has fallen prey to a common fallacy, which I 
call the 'supervenience fallacy', that of thinking that because a certain class 
of properties supervenes on another class, (members of) the former are 
nothing over and above (members of) the latter. This fallacy is committed in 
metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, as well as in meta-ethics, and it is 
abetted by certain turns of phrase. If the moral supervenes on the descrip- 
tive, it is often said to be a consequence that the descriptive 'determines' 
the moral; that it 'constitutes' the moral; that 'anything that can be done 
with moral terms can be done with descriptive terms'; and sometimes that 
the moral is 'nothing over and above' the descriptive. 
Each of the quoted phrases has a stronger and a weaker sense, and the 
corresponding slogans differ dramatically according to which sense they are 
interpreted as having. For example, the claim that the descriptive de- 
termines the moral, in the weak sense, means nothing more than that fixing 
the descriptive suffices to fix the moral. This follows directly from super- 
venience. In the stronger sense it means that moral properties are nothing 
but descriptive properties ('nothing over and above' descriptive properties, 
again in a strong sense). This is a much more substantial thesis, one that 
manifestly does not follow from supervenience. Generally speaking, the 
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fallacy consists in an illicit slide from the weak sense to the strong sense of 
such slogans. ThatJackson is guilty of committing this fallacy is evidenced in 
the following passage: 
... ethical language may be needed in practice to capture the similarities among the 
various descriptive ways that (S) tells us constitute ethical nature, but ethical proper- 
ties are, nevertheless, possibly infinitely disjunctive descriptive properties - there is 
nothing more 'there' other than the relevant similarities among those descriptive 
ways. There is no 'extra' feature that the ethical terms are fastening onto.17 
Only property identity would establish that there is nothing extra here, 
nothing over and above the descriptive; only the identity of moral and 
descriptive properties would warrant the claim that the moral is nothing 
more than the descriptive. If they, and other pairs of (sets of) properties like 
them, were indeed identical, then there would be no multiple realizability in 
each case, and no reason to take a misleading disjunctive detour through 
supervenience.'8 
Finally, Gibbard offers a pair of considerations in defence of his classifica- 
tion as natural of properties like the one designated by D, which can be 
turned into objections to the present argument. First, he claims that to 
restrict he term 'natural' in such a way that it does not apply to predicates 
like D, and the properties they ostensibly refer to, is problematic. It is 
problematic because there may be no interesting reasonably well delimited 
conception of the term which is so restricted.19 What is to count as natural? 
A complete answer to this question does not have to be given here. All 
that matters is that moral properties do not count as natural from the first, 
as it were, and Gibbard and Jackson are agreed that this is the case. If it 
were not, there would be no need to show that plan-laden concepts pick out 
descriptive properties, or to accommodate the moral into the naturalistic 
realm. Whatever the natural encompasses, it does not include, at first 
glance, the moral. And despite the supervenience of the moral upon the 
natural or descriptive, it is not possible to pick out moral properties such as 
being morally good in purely naturalistic vocabulary. Given the constraints, 
this is enough to show that such properties are not natural properties. 
Secondly, Gibbard thinks that the more liberal conception of properties 
he endorses is supported by the possibility that a given plan-laden concept 
'7Jackson, pp. 124-5; see also p. 146, where he claims that as a consequence of moral 
supervenience, 'there is no ethical nature over and above descriptive nature'. No one innocent 
of the supervenience fallacy would be tempted byJackson's line here. 18 For other instances of the fallacy, see D. Armstrong, Universals: an Opinionated Introduction 
(New York: Westview, 1989), pp. 56, ioo; D. Lewis, 'Reduction of Mind', in S. Guttenplan 
(ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy ofMind (Oxford: Blackwell, I994), PP- 413-14; D. Chalmers, 
The Conscious Mind (Oxford UP, 1996), p. 41. 19 Gibbard, pp. 101o-2. The quotation to follow is from the same pages. 
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will correspond to many different atural properties. So being OK to do, which 
is a paradigmatic plan-laden concept for Gibbard, might be realized by 'a 
complex property that, say, trades off pleasure, integrity, treating people as 
ends ... and the like. In either case, there is a natural property in my sense 
that constitutes being OK to do.' 
It is difficult tounderstand why Gibbard thinks this supports his concep- 
tion of what it takes for a property to be natural. There being no single 
natural property which realizes a normative property (or concept) is 
evidence that the latter is not itself natural. Gibbard's point makes sense, so 
far as I can see, only if one assumes that disjunctions of natural properties 
are themselves natural; and this, of course, is precisely the point at issue. 
Hence the possibility he cites, so far from bolstering his conception of that in 
which being natural consists, actually serves to undermine it.20 
V 
It has been argued here that a certain approach towards vindicating 
naturalism fails. The approach, taken in slightly different ways by Jackson 
and Gibbard respectively, is to try to show that the identity of moral and 
descriptive (or natural) properties follows from the undisputed super- 
venience of the moral upon the descriptive. It fails because it is not possible 
even to talk about a given moral property without employing moral terms or 
concepts. Of course Gibbard is no naturalist, properly speaking; but I have 
shown that part of the larger project of his book is to effect a synthesis of 
meta-ethical positions, so that his brand of expressivism comes out looking 
very similar to a certain kind of naturalism. The considerations advanced 
here cast doubt on this central part of his attempted synthesis. It has been 
argued that the reductive technique in question, which seeks to derive 
property identity from implications of supervenience, falls foul of a pair of 
kind constraints; this in turn implies, I have argued, that the disjunctive 
property corresponding to any given moral property - if it exists at all, 
which is highly doubtful - is not a natural property. 
What then ofJackson's accommodation strategy for moral discourse? As 
remarked at the outset of the paper, he claims that the fact that the 
descriptive story about a given world entails that world's moral story shows 
that the moral is unproblematic ontologically. My arguments seem to me to 
20 It should be acknowledged that Gibbard has a notion of constitution distinct from and 
stronger than supervenience (see p. 95), and that he claims that moral properties, such as they 
are, are constituted by natural properties. But since this plays no role in his argument for the 
claim that moral concepts pick out natural properties, I shall ignore it here. 
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show that Jackson's strategy fails, given his strong naturalistic assumptions. 
For the fact that the descriptive story entails the moral story does nothing to 
show that moral properties do not exist over and above descriptive ones. 
Such a conclusion is anathema to one who, like Jackson, thinks that there is 
a very real sense in which the descriptive nature of a world exhausts its 
reality. He must presumably either find another way to 'accommodate' the 
moral, or join Gibbard in opting for expressivism. 
It does not of course follow from the conclusions reached here that all 
versions of naturalism are false or hopeless. What does follow is that if 
naturalism is to succeed, it must be via one of the three traditional routes 
mentioned at the outset of the paper. There is no easy road to ethical 
naturalism.21 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
21 Thanks to Russ Shafer-Landau, and to a pair of anonymous referees, for helpful 
comments. 
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